| The winter of
1916-1917 had also proved unpleasant, prompting Anson to write to
Redmond “I hope you are not frozen stiff up at Pontarlier: It must
be very beastly up there now, you have my heartfelt
sympathy”.
Throughout 1917 Redmond continued to promote his position;
frequently writing to his superiors about the benefits of his base
in Pontarlier, which included being able to offer the safety and
sanctuary of an allied country, as well as the ease with which he
could instruct agents coming from England.
As well as the agents coming from England,
Redmond inherited a network of agents which he ran whilst in
Switzerland. He maintained a list of 20 or so agents, some of whom
had their own sub-agents who worked for them. This list was fluid,
with new agents being added and others being removed. They were
mostly recruited in London or Switzerland, although two, known as
Pastor and Alfonso, came from Spain. The Spanish experiment wasn’t a
success: Pastor was dismissed in January 1917 with the note “Has
been absolutely useless.” Alfonso was little better – he found it
very difficult to get a visa for Germany and was forced to wait in
Berne for a long time.
Not all agents were poor: the agents code-named
Mary, Walfisch and Juliette were much better. Mary sent in excellent
C.E. reports and recruited agents for M.I. work in Germany.
Walfisch’s C.E. work was described as “very useful” and he was
“instrumental with Mary in getting several enemy agents notably
“Joselet” arrested.”
Redmond noted that Juliette “Has done good
work in obtaining M.I. in districts around Delmont Basle etc. Also
C.E. and contraband. Has several agents in Alsace, this man if
carefully nursed should prove very valuable.”(8)
The arrest of enemy agents in Switzerland was,
of course, hugely important, but throughout the Great War British
intelligence constantly tried to recruit and send agents to Germany.
Their intelligence was enormously important: The Western Front was,
for long periods of time, relatively static, with troop movements
from one part of the front to another indicating where the next
offensive might come. For this reason, the watching of troop trains
was of great significance to gauge their movements. From Pontarlier,
Redmond gave detailed instructions for agents going to Germany.
These ranged from the identification and recording of troop
movements, through the composition of German army units, to lists of
specific information that was needed. Throughout his papers the
importance of careful and correct observation of troop trains was
constantly stressed.
Redmond also had to instruct agents in how to
avoid detection – this applied as much to agents in Switzerland as
those going to Germany: some of his advice may seem obvious, and
even slightly comical – “Never confide in Women” or “Never give your
photo to anyone, especially a female”(9) – but,
especially when considering the newness of the Secret Service, some
still seems relevant and will be familiar to anyone who has watched
spy movies – to escape when being followed “get on a tram and, as
soon as the agent gets on, get off yourself.”
Counter Espionage (C.E.) was an important part
of Redmond’s work in Switzerland. Its objects were “(1) To discover
German agents in Switzerland, - active, passive, and recruiters. (2)
To fight by all possible means the German organisations”. Redmond
divided C.E. into “active” and “passive”. Active C.E. had as its
objective “the extermination of the German organisation” by
gathering proof against suspects, then luring them into France where
they could be arrested. Alternatively they could be arrested by the
Swiss authorities.
Passive C.E. was largely indirect information
gathering, such as getting information on people applying for visas
and passports. As mentioned above, this C.E. work was successful,
with some 20 or 30 enemy agents being arrested by the end of
1917.
Redmond was a character who was not easily
satisfied: by December 1917 he was expressing his disappointment
with the direction C.E. work was going – he felt it had been
“subordinated to use for passport work and enquiries from London and
G.H.Q.”(10) To counter this Redmond proposed a
“Militant” C.E. Branch – Col. Dansey held the view that the first
C.E. role was to protect our own agents – Redmond proposed to do
this by going on the offensive: infiltrating the enemy organisation
and then destroying the organisation. Redmond also wanted to use his
militant C.E. organisation to stem the flow of German agents across
the Swiss border into France by setting up a network of allied
agents in the main frontier towns.
Redmond continued his work through the spring of
1918, but on 21st April, Commander Myres wrote to him
with orders to proceed to the British Legation, Athens, via Rome, as
Officer in charge of C.E. enquiries.
I'll put the next part of his story on this site
as soon as I've completed it.
Notes
(1)
Personal memo P.25/11/17.
(2) Secret Service by Christopher
Andrew p.211
(3) The
Search for C by Alan
Judd p.399
(4)
Passport no. 101720
(5) Memo
dated 25/11/17
(6) Memo
139, Pontarlier 1/4/1917
(7)
Memorandum Pontarlier 19-4-17
(8)
Lausanne District Agents list
(9)
Instructions for C.E. Agents Active and
Passive
(10) Mission
Anglaise Pontarlier 31/12/17 C.E. Active and
Passive
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